If others saw this, they would mediate between the parties at the meeting. (1) Parker, C. (2012). Economic rationalities of governance and ambiguity in the criminalization of cartels. British Journal of Criminology, 52(5), 974-996. Levenstein, M.C., &Suslow, V. Y. (2011). This is serious: the determinants of the duration of the cartel. Journal of Law and Economics, 54(2), 455-492.
The question of how companies manage to stabilize cartels has received only limited attention in the criminological literature. There are some criminal studies of economic crime on antitrust behaviour, such as Geis` groundbreaking study (1987) on price cartels in the heavy machinery industry. These studies explain antitrust behaviour by the need to manage and avoid uncertainties, make outcomes more predictable, and minimize risk (Agnew et al. 2009; Paternoster and Simpson 1996; Jamieson 1994; Geis 1987; Sonnenfeld and Lawrence 1978). However, these studies have no longitudinal perspective on cartels. To the extent that studies take a longitudinal approach to economic crime, they focus on the course of individual life and not on completions (Piquero and Weisburd, 2009; Piquero 2012; Weisburd and Waring 2001). However, cartels are monitoring their deals, which shows some skepticism on the part of companies about the level of trust. We can distinguish different functions of these informal control mechanisms: companies collect information about the actions of other parties to the cartel; assess whether it is in conformity with the agreement; and decide what type of response should be applied to the fraudulent party. Cartels use two main mechanisms to control the deal: sales reporting meetings, etc.
and independent directors. In most cases, cartels use some form of reporting such as turnover, market share, and prices. A Director General explains the topics discussed at these meetings: international cartel agreements, usually between companies that hold monopolistic positions in their own country, were first concluded between the First and Second World Wars. . . .