Subsequent Agreements And Subsequent Practice In Relation To The Interpretation Of Treaties

Therefore, the concluding article2, quoted in the second paragraph of the commentary on the above point, in which "the primary means of interpretation covered by section 31, all of which must be taken into account in the process of interpretation," is incorrect. Only the instruments of interpretation covered by Article 31, paragraph 3, must be taken into account. The provision of Article 31, paragraph 1, is not only taken into account, but also effective or applied. This view has been expressed in other serious texts interpreting the treaties. For example, during the discussion of Article 31, paragraph 3, under the general title "General Rule," divides the elements of Article 31 into "general rule" and "interpretive means in addition to context," including subsequent agreements and subsequent practices in the latter category, namely. The reservation of a "general rule" for Article 31, paragraph 1[ O Dorr, "Art. 31: "General Rule of Interpretation" at O Dur and K Schmalenbach (Eds), Vienna Convention on Treaty Law: A Comment (Springer 2012) 521 ff.]. He believes that the means of interpretation that are added to the context must "justify the true meaning of the relevant contractual terms." Sorel and Boré Eveno, who analysed the decisions of the International Court of Justice and regional courts, concluded that Article 31, paragraph 1, provides the main method of interpretation, while Article 31, paragraph 3, is a secondary use [JM Sorel and V Boré Eveno, "1969 Vienna Convention: Art. 31: "General Rule of Interpretation" in O Corten and P Klein (Eds), : A commentary. Volume I (Oxford 2011), at 817-829.

This distinction between subsequent agreement and practice in the strict sense and subsequent practice in the broadest sense has implications for three important issues of any practical interpretation of the treaty. The first facet of the problem (section 2) is its effect on the tension between static and dynamic, restrictive and effective. [3] The question here is how reports can cope with a trend in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which, over time, has departed from a "subjective" approach that has great weight in recognizing the will of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract, to a more "objective" view that takes the perspective of the moment of interpretation. [4] With respect to Class Ii, the ICJ cases cited include, in addition to the reference to the organization`s "own practice" in the nuclear weapons opinion already mentioned, other expertise in which the ICJ has not made a statement on the exact interpretability value of institutional practice. [32] In the reports, the term "at least" is considered "other after-practice" in accordance with section 32 of the VCLT. [33] The paragraph reminds the interpreter that agreements can be used to modify or modify a contract, but that these subsequent agreements are subject to Article 39 of the 1969 Vienna Convention and must be distinguished from subsequent agreements covered by Article 31, paragraph 3, point a) (point 21 of the commentary on the draft conclusion 7). Indeed, at second reading, the Commission does not vote "in the Commission". When you read the comments at first reading, you will often find references to "some members felt that" and "some members disagree," etc. You will not find such indications in the texts of second reading. But we are talking about something else here. The proposal should not reflect the views of the minority "within the Commission." On the contrary, the proposal should reflect the fact that there was a different point of view in the literature and not "within the Commission".

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